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DIA FOR LEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019

TAGS: [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#) [START](#)

SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI):
CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER
23, 2009

REF: GENEVA 0944 (SFO-GVA-VI-014)

Classified By: A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States
START Negotiator. Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-024.

2. (U) Meeting Date: October 23, 2009
Time: 4:00 - 5:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

3. (S) At the October 23, 2009 Conversion or Elimination (CorE) Working Group (WG) meeting, the Russian side presented and reviewed their revised draft text on CorE. the Russian Delegation said much of their text was consistent with the U.S.-proposed text that was delivered to the Russian side the previous day. Colonel Ryzhkov held the floor for the majority of the meeting and read through both his talking points and several sections of the new Russian CorE text verbatim. While the Russian text contained many similarities, two conceptual differences emerged, one being a new "General Rules" section that was intended to serve as a catch-all for CorE notifications, exhibitions and inspections, while the other was the concept of permitting conversions of ICBM and SLBM launchers for use with other types of ICBMs and SLBMs. Mr. Elliott agreed that the WG had made considerable progress on both text and general concepts and reminded both sides that maintaining momentum the

following week would be critical for achieving closure.

¶4. (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY: A new "General Rules" Chapeau in the Russian Text, Russian Core Talking Points and Text, and, Much Ado About Similar Text.

A NEW "GENERAL RULES"
CHAPEAU IN THE RUSSIAN TEXT

¶5. (S) Ryzhkov began the second meeting of the Core WG by thanking Elliott for delivering the latest revision of the U.S.-proposed Core text the prior day (REFTEL) and proposed that the day's WG focused on a section-by-section overview of the Russian new draft Core text, followed by a general discussion of the new ideas and concepts presented in that text. Elliott replied that, based on the previous day's one-on-one meeting between he and Ryzhkov, there was much agreement both technically and textually in the respective documents.

¶6. (S) Ryzhkov began his overview by stating that the Russian side had created a "General Rules" chapeau meant to capture the large quantity of provisions and notifications that were repeated throughout the various sections of previous U.S. texts. Before reading his talking points, Ryzhkov opined that the "General Rules" chapeau could contain additional items and invited the U.S. side to provide them. Ryzhkov then read, verbatim, the Russian "General Rules" section from the draft document.

Begin text:

¶1. Part One: Notifications of the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms shall be provided in accordance with subsection IV of Section IV of the Annex to this Treaty.

¶2. Part Two: After completion of conversion of an item of SOA into a different item of SOA or into an item which is not an item of SOA, the converting Party shall conduct a one-time exhibition in accordance with paragraph 9 of Article XI of this Treaty.

¶3. Part Three: Prior to the initiation of conversion of one item of SOA into an item which is not an item of SOA, the converting Party shall conduct a demonstration of the procedures used within the framework of the BCC.

End text.

RUSSIAN C OR E TALKING
POINTS AND TEXT

¶7. (S) Ryzhkov asked that the U.S. side consider this approach and pointed out that almost every section of the U.S.-proposed text had these general provisions throughout. He stated further that the "General Rules" section could contain other verbiage that would shorten the document if common language could be consolidated in this section. Ryzhkov read through his talking points concerning the main sections of the Russian Core text.

Begin text:

Section I in the Russian side's document covers the procedures for the elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs.

Paragraph one covers the elimination procedures for liquid fueled ICBMs.

Paragraph two covers the elimination of liquid fueled SLBMs. (Begin comment: Ryzhkov indicated that these two sections were almost identical to the U.S. section. End

comment.)

Paragraph three covers the elimination of solid fueled ICBMs and SLBMs. There is a key procedure followed by two additional procedures. (Begin comment: This is incorrect. The Russian text provides the eliminating party three choices. Two are described in the text and the third is the "wild card" option. End comment.).

For the elimination of solid fueled ICBMs, the Russian side would consider the removal of propellant by burning as a key procedure.

The second procedure is the removal of propellant by another means, the separation of all missile stages followed by cutting the first stage into two parts.

The third procedure would be the "wild card" procedure,

meaning that this procedure would be determined by the eliminating party to render the ICBM or SLBM unusable. The eliminating party would provide a notification stating what specific procedures would be used. In the event the other side disagreed with the stated procedures, the eliminating party would detail the specific procedures through photos, displays, slides or other appropriate means at the BCC. That presentation would be used to persuade the other side that the procedures were still valid.

The procedures our side lists for the elimination of launch canisters for ICBMs and loading tubes for SLBMs are very similar to those of the U.S. side.

There is a notification when the item is eliminated and the item should remain visible to national technical means (NTM).

I used this section as an example because the provisions and procedures are common throughout our document.

The final paragraph highlights the fact that an elimination procedure can be verified by the inspecting team. The verification is important to prove that the item has been eliminated

Section II covers the conversion or elimination of ICBM launchers.

Our side included some new provisions. This section is not entirely similar to the corresponding U.S. section as it contains procedures for the conversion of ICBM launchers.

Each party is guided by the future plans of its Strategic Systems.

Our side is aware that the U.S. does not intend to convert ICBM launchers. We want to retain this as an option in the treaty. Section II has two subsections: one covers the elimination of ICBM launchers the other covers the conversion of ICBM launchers.

The section covering the elimination of ICBM launchers itself contains two subsections:

The elimination of silo launchers

The elimination of mobile launchers

With respect to the elimination of silo launchers, both sides have very similar approaches concerning the mandatory procedures. However, we have differences in how the elimination is implemented.

The elimination of mobile launchers section contains a described procedure, which is the removal or destruction of the erector/launcher mechanism, as well as the "wild card" option.

The Russian Federation wants to retain an option for

converting our mobile launchers. For example, we may use the converted mobile launcher vehicle for agricultural purposes. As such, we use the "wild card" option for the conversion of ICBM launchers. In this new treaty, both sides agree to no limits on the conversion of ICBM launchers from one type of

ICBM to another type of ICBM. The Russian side believes the converting party should hold an exhibition to remove any doubt by the inspecting party.

An inspection team can confirm the conversion or elimination procedures for ICBM launchers.

Section III covers the conversion or elimination of SLBM launchers.

Our side has minor differences with the U.S. proposal.

We provide for one key procedure for the elimination of SLBM launchers which is to remove the hatch of the submarine.

Our side also retains the "wild card" option for the elimination of SLBM launchers.

As for the conversion of SLBM launchers, our text contains three approaches:

The height or diameter of the launcher shall be decreased so that the launcher can no longer contain the smallest SLBM deployed by the possessing party.

Removal of critical components necessary for the launch of SLBMs.

The third approach is the "wild card" option.

Section four covers the conversion or elimination of Heavy Bombers.

There are two sections: The elimination of heavy bombers and the conversion of heavy bombers.

The procedure for the elimination of heavy bombers calls for the removal of one of the bomber's basic design elements, which is to say its tail, wings, or fuselage.

The conversion of heavy bombers has two sections:

The conversion of nuclear capable heavy bombers to another type of nuclear capable heavy bomber; and

The conversion of nuclear capable heavy bombers to non-nuclear capable heavy bombers.

There is much common text with the U.S. concerning how a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments will be converted to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

Section five covers other procedures for removal from accountability.

Section six covers the elimination of other facilities.

Any declared facility shall be considered to be eliminated for the purposes of the Treaty if all strategic offensive arms, including training models of missiles, training launchers of ICBMs, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, launch-associated support vehicles, transporter-loaders and driver training vehicles specified

for such a facility have been removed or eliminated.

A notification will be provided upon completion of the procedures.

Our text provides for follow-on inspections to confirm the

conversion procedures, for example, of SLBM launchers from nuclear to non-nuclear or the conversion of heavy bombers to a non-nuclear configuration.

I would like to return to the concepts from Section five, "Other procedures for removal from accountability." The two sides have a common approach and language. Allow me to read from the text.

Part 1 covers Accidental Loss. If, in the judgment of the Party possessing an item subject to limitations provided for in the Treaty, that item is lost as a result of an accident, notification thereof shall be provided.

Part 2 covers Disablement Beyond Repair. If, in the judgment of the Party possessing an item accountable under the provisions of the Treaty, that item is disabled beyond repair, notification thereof shall be provided.

Part 3 covers Static Display. Prior to being placed on static display, ICBMs, SLBMs, launch containers, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers shall be rendered inoperable and unusable so that they cannot be used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. A notification shall be provided.

Part four covers heavy bombers for use as ground trainers. Prior to being used as a ground trainer, a heavy bomber shall be rendered inoperable and unusable so that it cannot be used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. A notification shall be provided.

Part five covers flight tests or static testing of ICBMs and SLBMs. Prior to a flight test or static test of an ICBM or SLBM, notification thereof shall be provided. An ICBM or SLBM shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty from the date of the flight test or static test specified in such a notification.

End text.

MUCH ADO ABOUT SIMILAR TEXT

¶8. (S) Elliott said he recognized the agreement between much of the U.S.- and Russian-proposed texts, while noting that Russia's section five omitted in many paragraphs the U.S.-proposed subparagraph (b) wording that the item shall cease to be subject to the treaty. Ryzhkov declared it was possible that the Russian proposal contained omissions or errors and that it should be considered a draft text. Ryzhkov reminded the U.S. side that all CoreE notifications in the Russian-proposed text were captured in their new "General Rules" chapeau. Elliott opined that much progress had been made during the week and that next week would be critical to maintaining momentum.

¶9. (U) Documents exchanged.

- Russia:

-- Document of the Russian Side for Section III:
Procedures For Conversion or Elimination, dated October 27,
¶2009.

¶10. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Elliott
Lt Col Goodman
LCDR Brons
Mr. Dwyer
Mr. Hanchett
Mr. McConnell

Ms. Purcell
LT Sicks
Mr. Strauss
Dr. Hopkins (Int)

RUSSIA

Col Ryzhkov
Mr. Ivanov
Col Izrazov
Mr. Leontiev
Col Novikov
Mr. Shevchenko
Mr. Smirnov
Col Zaitsev
Ms. Zharkikh
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

11. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
GRIFFITHS